Preferences For Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study by Ruben Durante & Louis Putterman
Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness:
An Experimental Study
Ruben Durantey Louis Puttermanz
July 30, 2009
ABSTRACT
Why is there political support for progressive taxation and government transfers in western democ-
racies? We study the importance of fairness preferences, risk aversion, and self-interest in deter-
mining support for redistribution by conducting a laboratory experiment that includes both ele-
ments not previously found together and novel features. Our design permits within-subject com-
parisons of the effects of earned vs. unearned sources of pre-tax-and-transfer inequality, within-
subject comparisons of choice as a disinterested observer of inequalities among others versus that
as an affected party, and within-subject comparisons of choice with and without uncertainty as to
own pre-tax income. Between subject variation lets us study the effects of changing the direct
cost of taxation to the decision-maker and the efﬁciency cost to the society. We use large subject
groups and the actual U.S. pre-tax income distribution to create a more macro framing than in
related past experiments. We show how our results can be used to calibrate individual utility func-
tions deﬁned over own expected income, own income variance, social inequality, and efﬁciency,
and we examine what the estimates mean for the median preference for redistribution and the level
of redistribution that maximizes additive social welfare. Most of our subjects prefer that there be
less inequality among others and demand for redistribution responds in predictable ways to the
cost of taxation and to the deadweight loss associated with it. We also ﬁnd that preferred levels of
redistribution are highly responsive to whether or not pre-tax incomes are determined according
to task performance, for male subjects, but much less so for female subjects, with this difference
accounting for much of a displayed gender gap in which females prefer more redistribution.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Redistribution of income through government taxes and transfers has long been normal practice in industrial
democracies. Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study, Branko Milanovic (2000) estimated that the
income share of the bottom two quintiles of households in 14 OECD countries in the early 1990s was on
average 14.7% higher when measured on a post-tax-and-transfer than on a pre-tax-and-transfer basis. Even in
the U.S., the least redistributive of the wealthy industrialized countries, Milanovic found a difference of almost
8% between the income share of the bottom 40% of households after versus before taxes and transfers.
The question of how much redistribution there ought to be is one that in the end must cross the boundary
between positive and normative discussion. But there are many points on which positive economic analysis
can be helpful. Studies that attempt to estimate the magnitude of the trade-off between equality and efﬁciency
are one example. An understanding of why income is redistributed can also be pursued as a matter of positive
analysis.
Among the possible explanations of why redistribution occurs in democracies is that there is a social con-
sensus behind it, that is, a large majority of citizens feel better off living in a society with less inequality because
it reﬂects their ethical values, increases their perceived personal and property security (Thurow, 1971), or some
combination of these or other reasons. In the limit, redistribution could be Pareto improving, i.e. even those
with high incomes could prefer some degree of redistribution to occur despite the material cost to them. If
redistribution were universally preferred, then an efﬁcient amount of redistribution could in principle be found,
whether using the Pareto criterion or by a Benthamite social welfare function.
At the other end of the spectrum of explanations is the possibility that redistribution results from the com-
bination of majority rule and self-interest, as emphasized in traditional political-economic models of redistri-
bution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Sinn, 1995, among others). The distribution
of incomes in most societies is right-skewed, with the income of the median individual or household being
far below the arithmetic mean. Thus, assuming that a given amount of revenue has to be raised by either a
head tax (taking a ﬁxed amount per person), a ﬂat tax (taking an equal proportion of income from each per-
son), or a progressive tax (taking a proportion of income that is higher the greater the individual’s income),
a self-interested median voter will always prefer the ﬂat over the head tax and the progressive over the ﬂat
tax, assuming absence of incentive considerations. If government expenditure beneﬁts all more or less equally,
political economy models that assume equal participation in elections always predict that progressive taxes will
be adopted in market democracies. The same logic can be extended from funding of public goods to provision
of health and other services to providing transfer payments. In the absence of incentive and other dynamic
considerations, however, such models predict the complete leveling of incomes, something not observed in
practice.
The above discussion leaves out one more important reason why self-interest might lead to redistribution:
in the absence of adequate means of insuring themselves against negative shocks, individuals with average or
above-average incomes may favor redistributive taxation as a form of social insurance (Benabou and Ok, 2001;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). For this to happen, tax regimes must be relatively persistent over time, and
voters must have some degree of uncertainty about how they will fare in the future. Both these assumptions are
reasonable in real contexts.
Our remarks about social or ethical preferences for redistribution are also incomplete insofar as they fail to
consider that the value judgments in question may depend on the nature and causes of pre-tax inequality, and
on how these are perceived by the voters. Some authors have suggested that differences in voter preferences
may depend, at least in part, on their perceptions of whether the distributive outcomes of the market economy
2are perceived as fair or not (Piketty 1995; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Alesina,
et al. 2004; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Using survey data from several sources,
Fong (2001, 2003) ﬁnds supporting evidence for the United States that such fairness considerations matter to
people.
An extensive experimental literature has investigated how agents’ choices in various economic interactions
andgamesofdivisionmaybedictatedbyforcesotherthanself-interest, suchasaversiontoinequality(Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003; Camerer, 2003) and how the origin of initial entitlements affects
the extent of non-self-interested behavior (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Burrows and Loomes, 1994). However,
most of these studies have focused on small group interactions, and it is unclear how these ﬁndings can be
generalized to explain attitudes toward equality and redistribution at the societal level. Our experiment joins a
relatively small existing set of studies of preferences on redistribution that are designed with a macro-political
economy application in mind and involve choices that are potentially costly in real money terms to the decision-
maker (Ackert et al., 2007; Krawczyk, 2007; Beckman et al., 2004; Beck, 1994). Studies in which respondents’
statements of preference among distributions have no payoff consequences for them include Amiel and Cowell
(1992), Amiel et al. (1999), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), and Carlson et al. (2005).
To investigate the extent of social preferences for redistribution, their sensitivity to the determinants of
inequality and to perceptions of fairness, and the more general role that self-interest plays in voting for redis-
tributive taxes, we conducted a series of laboratory decision experiments involving a large number of subjects.
One goal was to shed light on the degree to which observed redistributive outcomes in democracies are ex-
plained by self-interest versus social preferences for equality. Thus, each subject in our experiments was asked
to express a preference for redistribution among the micro community of participants both under the condition
of being an outside observer of a distribution of income among others, and in the situation of being an affected
party with a speciﬁc interest stemming from the expectation or knowledge of having a higher or lower pre-tax
income. To investigate subjects’ willingness to pay for income equalization and their concern over the possibly
“leaky” nature of taxation and redistribution, we varied across treatments both a direct cost to the decision-
maker and an administrative or efﬁciency loss to recipients. We also had subjects make decisions both under
uncertainty about their relative position in the pre-tax distribution and when uncertainty had been resolved.
We used mainly student subjects but also a non-student adult comparison group. Our design contains several
new elements, including large group size, explicit replication of an actual country’s income distribution, and
multiple income determination methods in combination with multiple decision contexts.
We ﬁnd most subjects willing to pay to increase equality of earnings among others whom they do not know.
This willingness varies in predictable ways with the direct cost to the decision-maker, and with their political
views and (real world) incomes. It varies in an intuitive way with whether subjects “earn” their unequal labora-
tory incomes, although this difference itself is sensitive to gender in an interesting manner echoing the political
“gender gap” (females are more reluctant to accept even “earned” inequality). Subjects value efﬁciency, re-
distributing less when more income is thereby lost. Despite the clear evidence of “social preferences” most
subjects’ choices regarding redistribution reﬂect their personal interest when this is also at stake. We also ﬁnd
a link between risk aversion and desire for redistribution. Finally, we show how subjects’ decisions can be
used to ﬁt utility functions which are clearly concave in the degree of social equality and with which both the
median-preferred and the (additive) social welfare maximizing level of redistribution can be calculated. Using
these estimates, we compare the redistribution desired by our subjects to the levels of redistribution delivered
by real-world democracies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design and rationale of our
3experiments. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for predicting and interpreting the results. In section
4 we illustrate and discuss our main results. Section 5 concludes.
II. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We designed our experiment to elicit choices with respect to redistribution of income from twenty-one par-
ticipants in each of sixteen sessions. In outline, each subject ﬁrst chose her preferred level of a linear tax to
redistribute earnings among twenty subjects with pre-tax incomes mirroring the U.S. pre-tax income distribu-
tion. Her choice was implemented if he or she became the randomly selected dictator who earned an amount
unaffected by it (or largely so) - a disinterested observer condition. Then each subject chose a level of redis-
tributive tax for the alternative situation in which the choosers income was one of the affected twenty. Each
choice was in fact a quadruple, with a separate redistributive tax level possible for each of four different de-
terminants of initial incomes, two amenable to interpretation as earned, two not. In about half of the sessions,
the second set of choices could be remade after the resolution of uncertainty about own income. Randomiza-
tions determined whether the disinterested or interested decision-maker condition held and which of the four
methods determined pre-tax income rankings. Although only the eight (or twelve) choices just described are
of focal concern to us, subjects required more than 90 minutes to learn the nature of their choices, make the
decisions, engage in the tasks potentially determinative of own pre-tax income, make a ﬁnal set of decisions
providing a measure of risk aversion, and complete a background survey. A potential direct cost of redistribu-
tion to the decisive individual, and a possible efﬁciency loss to others, varied among sessions. We now describe
the experiment in greater detail.
The sessions began with a set of instructions that appeared on the subjects’ computer screens and were
simultaneously read aloud by the experimenter so that all subjects were aware of facing identical rules and
procedures. At the end of this ﬁrst instruction stage, subjects were invited to ask questions and then answered
ﬁve questions to test their comprehension of the procedures. Subjects were informed that there would be two
additional parts to the experiment and that further instructions would follow.
As part of the on-screen instructions, we presented a table describing the set of provisional experimental
payoffs to be assigned to each of the participants (Appendix Table 1). The distribution of the payoffs, ranging
from $0.11 to $100.00, reproduced the distribution of the average pre-tax incomes of the lowest to highest
earning twentieths of the US population, which was also included in the table.1 Participants were informed that
the provisional earnings might be altered by a tax and transfer process.
In the disinterested observer condition of Part I, each subject was asked to choose a proportional tax rate
(0%, 10%, 20%, ..., 100%) to be applied to the pre-tax payoff distribution among the other twenty participants
with the proceeds being distributed equally among all subjects. Participants were informed that, at the end
of the session, one person would be randomly selected as the “decisive individual,” and his preferred tax rate
would be applied to the pre-tax earnings distribution of the other twenty participants to determine their ﬁnal
payoff. The decisive individual himself, however, would be affected neither by the pre-tax income proﬁle nor
by the tax and transfer to be implemented. By requiring all subjects to indicate their tax preferences at the
outset, we aimed at eliciting “outside observer” preferences from the entire subject pool. We used a dictator
rather than a median voter design so that subjects would have no reason to vote strategically.
Two additional dimensions of treatment variation were included in order to study agents’ willingness to pay
1Appendix Table 1’s reference to the distribution of income in the United States was partly intended as a framing device, to give
decisions a real world macro-economic reference. However, we attempted to steer a middle course, never telling subjects, for example,
that “this is an experiment to study your views about the distribution of income,” never using words like “just” or “fair,” etc. Compare, for
example, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) or Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala (2002).
4for a more equal earnings distribution and their concern for aggregate efﬁciency. The ﬁrst parameter (which
we will refer to as ‘tax cost’) measures the cost of each additional 10% tax in terms of a direct reduction in the
decisive individual’s payoff (compare to Andreoni and Miller, 2002). The tax cost parameter could take four
alternative values: $0, $0.25, $0.5, or $1. For example, in a session with tax cost equal to $0.5, the decisive
individual was charged 50 cents for imposing a tax of 10%, $1 for a tax of 20%, continuing up to $5 for a
tax of 100%. The second parameter measures ‘efﬁciency loss’, or the loss in the aggregate payoff of the other
participants associated with each additional 10% tax, in line with Okun’s (1975) “leaky bucket” argument.2
This could take three alternative values: 0%, 12.5%, or 25%. For instance, in a session with efﬁciency loss
of 25%, for each $10 collected as tax, $2.50 is lost and $7.50 is divided equally among the twenty affected
subjects.
Formally, the post-tax earnings of the twenty affected subjects are given by:






with yi being individual i’s pre-tax earnings, t being the tax rate chosen by the decisive individual, and e the
dead weight loss associated with the tax. The (expected) payoff of the outsider or decisive individual is given
by:
~ yd = yd   c(10  t) (2)
with yd being his or her base-payoff, t his preferred tax rate, and c the cost of each 10% tax. Participants were
informed that the base payoff of the decisive individual would be randomly drawn from the interval between
$19.80 (the mean pre-tax payoff of the other 20 subjects) and $21.80.3 Therefore, the ﬁnal payoff of the
decisive individual was either entirely unaffected by taxes and transfers (when c = $0, our pure “disinterested
observer” benchmark), or else was affected only by the cost of the tax he would choose to impose (“modiﬁed
disinterested observer” scenario).
Both the tax cost and the efﬁciency loss parameters were held constant during a given session, allowing
their effects to be measured only by between-subject comparisons.4 The effects of taxation were explained
to subjects verbally, graphically, using a table (Table 1), and by means of an equation resembling (1), so that
both more and less mathematically inclined subjects could understand them. Subjects were required to pass a
comprehension test before making any decision.
Prior to making their Part I choice, participants were also informed that the pre-tax earnings distribution
would be determined by one of four possible methods: a) randomly (“Random”); b) based on the average
income of their place of origin (“Where From,” derived from their home ZIP code, or, for subjects from coun-
2The efﬁciency loss parameter could be interpreted as a measure of the dead weight loss associated with distortionary taxation, or
alternatively, as the cost of administering the tax. The latter interpretation was offered to the subjects.
3Although it was impossible to totally eliminate comparisons between his own income and that of the other twenty subjects, we chose
a base income at least equal to the group average for the decisive individual with the aim of moderating the salience of such concerns.
A higher base income would reduce the likelihood of invidious comparisons with higher earners, but increase the likelihood of guilty
comparisons with low earners. The impact of the choice of base income can be explored in future experiments. Subjects were told that the
identity of the decisive individual would never be revealed, a measure we adopted to eliminate worry over the social tension that he might
feel from anyone unhappy with the chosen t. The decisive individual’s base income had a random element to make it difﬁcult even for that
individual to be sure he had been chosen, again to reduce worries about feelings of tension at the end of the session (this is also the reason
why a revision stage was not added in cases in which Part I was randomly selected.). We wanted each subject to focus as much as possible,
when choosing tax rates, on the consequences for her and others’ earnings, and not on any consequences for their own social interactions
with the others at the close of the experiment.
4Because each subject already made either eight or twelve tax choices in the session under varied sources of inequality, outsider versus
insider conditions, and uncertainty versus certainty of own income, while also performing a number of other tasks, varying tax cost or
efﬁciency within sessions seemed inadvisable.
5tries other than the US, from their home country);5 c) according to their performance on a general SAT-like
knowledge quiz (“Quiz”); d) according to their score on a computer-based game of skill (“Tetris”).6 The actual
method to be employed would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment. Each subject was asked to
choose a tax rate for each of the methods. The four methods were designed to mimic different determinants
of economic success in real life (luck, initial conditions, effort and/or ability, respectively) and were used to
assess differences in agents’ attitude toward redistribution relative to their perception of fairness.
After each subject chose four preferred tax rates for Part I, the nature of Part II was explained, questions
were invited, and subjects again took a comprehension test.
Part II was an ”involved participant” condition in which each subject was again asked to choose a tax rate
for each of the four methods, this time on the understanding that if selected to be the decisive individual, his
base payoff would be one of the twenty earnings levels described in Table 1 and his preferred tax rate would be
applied to the pre-tax earning distribution among twenty participants, including himself. In this case, another
subject was randomly selected to receive $19.80 to $20.80 and be unaffected by either the redistribution or the
tax cost. This section was designed to analyze the effect of involvement on subjects’ choices. The tax cost and
efﬁciency loss parameters varied across sessions but did not vary between Part I and II.
Before choosing Part II tax rates, subjects had to pass another comprehension test. They were then asked
to report how they expected to rank under the three non-random earnings determination methods, and how
conﬁdent they were about their guesses. They then chose the tax rates, took the 20 question Quiz, practiced
the Tetris game for two minutes, and played the Tetris game for ﬁve minutes. After this, a coin was tossed to
determine whether payments would be based on Part I or II. If Part II was selected, participants were informed
of their actual ranking in each of the four methods and were offered the possibility of revising their tax choice
(we will refer to this stage as ‘Part III’). This condition removed subjects’ uncertainty about their relative
position in the pre-tax distribution allowing us to study the effects of self-interest under certainty and with a
wider range of costs than in Part I.7 Then the earnings-determination method was selected (by the roll of two
dice), the decisive individual was chosen (by drawing a code number from a hat),8 and the ﬁnal payoffs were
announced.
Before exiting the session, subjects were asked to make a series of choices between earning a dollar with
certainty and participating in a lottery with a 50% probability of earning nothing and a 50% probability of
earning a positive amount which increased from one question to the next ($1.80 in the ﬁrst choice, $2.00 in the
second, $2.33 in the third, $2.67 in the fourth, and $3.00 in the last). This is a simple example of the ”multiple
price list” method of eliciting risk attitudes; see Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008. This section, which was not
pre-announced to the subjects, contributed on average an extra $1.50 (about 6%) to total earnings, and was
included in order to generate an indicator of subjects’ risk aversion. After completing it, subjects answered
a series of background questions regarding their gender, area of study, socioeconomic background, political
inclination, and views on inequality and taxation, while cash payments were counted out and brought to them
in closed envelopes. The timing of the experimental session is summarized in Figure 1. All the instructions are
available at: www.brown.edu/Research/IDE/walkthrough.
Overall, sixteen experimental sessions were held, involving a total of 336 Brown University undergraduate
5This information was collected during the log-in procedure, before subjects knew how it would be used
6Subjects were told that the version of Tetris to be played was specially modiﬁed to put more and less experienced players on a more
equal footing.
7Whereas the net cost of taxation to the decisive individual ranges from 0 to $1 in Part I, it ranges from + $9.3 per 10% tax for the top
earner to -$2.0 per 10% tax for the lowest earner in the revised decision stage. As mentioned in note 3, there was no revision of tax choices
if Part I was chosen.
8Although subjects themselves had no way to identify code numbers with individuals, this method was used to help convince subjects
that the identity of a decisive individual was indeed being determined randomly.
6students from a wide range of disciplines. Table 2 summarizes the number of sessions and subjects organized
by the exogenous parameters tax cost and efﬁciency loss. To check the sensitivity of the results to the subject
pool, additional sessions were conducted involving a total of 55 adult non-student subjects recruited from the
surrounding community. Results of the analysis of these additional sessions are not reported here, but in general
they are not qualitatively different than those with students.
III. HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS
In order to predict how subjects will behave in the experiment we need to make some assumptions about their
utility functions. A general form for subject i’s utility function is:
Ui = f(~ y1; ~ y2;:::; ~ yi;:::; ~ y21) (3)
where ~ yj6=i represent the post-tax earnings of each of the twenty other participants potentially affected by agent
i’s decision., and ~ yi represents i’s payoff if he/she is selected as the decisive individual, given by (2).
If individual i is purely self-interested, arguments other than ~ yi can be ignored without loss of predictive
power. Under this assumption, we can predict:
H0a: In the “disinterested observer” scenario (Part I) a purely self-interested individual will never select
t > 0 if the tax cost is strictly positive (c > 0). When c = 0 a purely self-interested agent will be equally likely
to select any of the possible tax rates (0;0:1;:::1).
In the “veil of ignorance” condition (Part II under random assignment), agent i’s choice will depend on the
values of c (tax cost), and e (efﬁciency loss), as well as on his degree of risk aversion. The following hypothesis
can be formulated:
H1a: In Part II under random income determination, a purely self-interested agent will never select t > 0
if he is risk neutral or risk loving, and if c > 0 and/or e > 0. Among risk-averse agents who are purely
self-interested, the utility-maximizing t is increasing in the degree of risk-aversion and decreasing in c and e.
For the other three methods in Part II, we predict for purely self-interested subjects:
H2a: In Part II under the Where From, Tetris, and Quiz methods, subjects conﬁdent of their predictions
about their relative standing will choose 0% or 100% taxation, depending on which maximizes their own
expected income. In order to maximize their expected utilities, risk averse subjects lacking conﬁdence in their
predictions may select positive tax rates which will be higher the lower the tax cost or efﬁciency loss, the
greater is their degree of risk aversion, the lower is their predicted rank for the method in question, and the
lower is their conﬁdence (ability to predict their standing).
Consider now an individual who, due to social preferences, attaches a positive weight to the earnings of
other subjects. We are interested in two types of preferences: preferences regarding equality and preferences
regarding efﬁciency.
Assuming that agents’ utility increases with equality in the distribution of incomes (e), we can write h(e)
as a general function linking utility and equality, with h0 > 0 if the subject prefers greater equality.9
Abstracting from agents’ concern for their own income, preference for aggregate efﬁciency can be formal-
ized in relation to the average of others’ aggregate payoffs. Intuitively, the more efﬁcient redistribution is, the
larger will be the total pie to be divided among the remaining Nj subjects, ceteris paribus. Thus, the utility
9The possibility that a subject prefers less equality, especially in cases in which he believes that unequal incomes have been justly
earned, will also be considered.
7individual i gets from aggregate efﬁciency can be written as: g( 1
Nj
P
j6=i ~ yj), with g0  0.10
Formally:









Function fi() can have varying degrees of concavity, thus incorporating risk aversion, and functions hi(),
and gi() can vary across individuals both randomly and in relation to a vector of measurable characteristics xi
such as gender, ethnicity, political inclination, and socioeconomic background.
The subscript m in hm;i indicates that i’s desire for equality may depend on what method is used to deter-
mine pre-tax earnings. For example i may have a strong desire for income equalization under the Where From
method if basing earnings on socioeconomic background is perceived by her as unfair, but a much weaker or
possibly no desire to redistribute if pre-tax income has been determined by performing a task.
We propose the following compound hypothesis:
H0b. Both in Part I and Part II (under random income assignment), a subject displaying some level of
social preferences may select t > 0 even if c > 0.
Several sub-hypotheses can be spelled out:
1. The larger c (tax cost) and e (efﬁciency loss), the smaller the value of t that will be selected, ceteris
paribus.
2. The greater i’s preference for equality under the pre-tax income determination method in question, the
larger the value of t the agent will select at every stage, ceteris paribus
3. Agents with similar characteristics x will tend to select similar values of t, ceteris paribus.
Concern for equality or efﬁciency does not imply the absence of simultaneously operating self-interest.
For example, in both Part II (for any methods other than Random) and Part III, an agent’s tax choice will be
affected by his expected rank in the pre-tax income distribution via the fi() function. Individuals with higher
(lower) expected pre-tax incomes will have a stronger bias toward a low (high) tax. However, concerns for
equality and efﬁciency may have effects countervailing those of self-interest, which will be stronger the closer
i’s (expected) rank is to the point at which @yi=@t = 0 (e.g. between ranks 7 and 8, when there is no efﬁciency
loss). Also, since Part II decisions are taken prior to learning one’s rank according to the various methods,
subjects are expected to prefer higher taxes the greater their lack of conﬁdence in their estimate of their relative
performance and the greater their degree of risk aversion. Subjects with (almost) any degree of risk aversion
have a self-interested reason to choose a high tax under the Random method, in Part II, if tax cost and efﬁciency
loss are zero (low).
IV. RESULTS
The following analysis is based on the results of the sixteen experimental sessions in which all participants were
undergraduatestudents. Studentsfrom awiderangeofdisciplinesparticipatedin theexperiment. Subjectswere
not drawn from particular courses; hence they were not likely to know each other before the sessions.11 The
large majority of participants appeared to have no difﬁculty understanding the instructions and answering the
control questions. Accordingly, all subjects took full part, making tax choices for each of the four methods -
10Here, too, g0 < 0 is a possibility, for instance a subject may feel better off the less others earn in comparison to her. We let our data
tell us whether subjects value the aggregate earnings of others positively, negatively, or neither.
11The 336 subjects were drawn from an undergraduate population numbering about 5700 students at the time of these experiments.
8both in Part I and II, and in Part III when this occurred (7 out of 16 sessions). All but one subject also completed
the debrieﬁng questions as well as the test for the assessment of risk aversion.
The background questions allowed us to collect information about a number of personal characteristics of
the participants. These variables, as well as the risk aversion indicator,12 are used in the econometric analysis.
The distribution of participants by personal characteristics is presented in Appendix Table 2. The questions
used to construct the indicators are also reported in the Appendix.
We next illustrate our key ﬁndings by presenting the main descriptive statistics. We then discuss the results
of a a set of multiple regressions estimated using data from all experimental sessions.13 The dependent variable
- the tax rate selected by each subject - is regressed on a set of explanatory variables which includes: tax cost,
efﬁciency loss,14 method dummies, risk aversion, a gender dummy variable, ethnic dummy variables, political
philosophy, home area income, socioeconomic status, and number of economics courses taken.
Considering the signiﬁcant share of 0% and 100% tax choices15, in order to address the concern that, if
allowed, some subjects may have chosen a tax rate less than 0% (regressive) or more than 100%, we estimate
the regressions using a Tobit model, censored at 0 and 1. We also estimated the same set of regressions using
ordinary least squares (OLS) obtaining very similar results. In what follows, we report the results of the Tobit
regressions.
A. The “disinterested observer” scenario: Part I
Do agents’ tax choices suggest the existence of a demand for redistribution among the micro-community of the
twenty other participants? The large majority of subjects display such a demand in the sense that, all things
being equal, they prefer earnings to be distributed more equally than the status quo, no matter which method
is used to determine pre-tax income distribution.Considering all the experimental sessions taken together, in
76.4% of the cases subjects favored some equalization of earnings (t > 0), in 44.2% of the cases a tax rate
of 50% or higher was chosen, and 14% of the time subjects decided to fully equalize earnings among other
participants. The mean tax rate is 42.4%. In principle this result could be due to the choices of those individuals
participating in sessions in which redistribution was free or very cheap. However, when only those sessions
with a positive tax cost are considered (12 sessions, 251 participants, 1004 tax choices) we observe a very
similar pattern. Furthermore, even restricting the analysis to those sessions in which redistribution was more
expensive (tax cost = $1 per 10%) the qualitative result remains the same. A large majority (69.9%) of the
participants still opted for a positive level of taxation, more than a third (34.8%) for a tax rate of 50% or higher,
and 7.7% were willing to pay a full $10.00 (approximately half of their expected payoff 16) to equalize earnings
among the other participants. This evidence supports hypothesis H0b against the alternative hypothesis H0a:
Does the existence of widespread support for redistribution imply that agents are not responsive to the cost
of taxation? The answer suggested by our Part I data is no. As shown in Figure 2a, participants in sessions
characterized by high values of tax cost chose lower levels of taxation than participants in sessions with zero
12Of the 335 subjects completing these parts, 308 answered the risk-aversion questions consistently and 27 in an inconsistent fashion,
that is they rejected a gamble with high expected value but accepted one with lower expected value. To keep the sample as large as
possible, we deﬁned a second measure of risk aversion which could be calculated for both consistent and inconsistent responders. To
check robustness, we carried out each piece of analysis also for the restricted sample composed by those who replied consistently. Since
the results turn out to be quite similar, we present in what follows, the analysis for the larger sample.
13In some cases, we restrict our attention to the sample of tax choices for one of the four methods of pre-tax determination (335
observations). Most of the time, however, we use the larger sample obtained by pooling together all of the 1340 observations (335 subjects
by four choices)
14Since subjects’s choices were very similar for levels of tax cost other than $1 per 10% (see Figure 2a), in order to simplify the
interpretation of the coefﬁcient we use a dummy variable which equals 1 for sessions with tax cost = $1, and 0 for the others. Similarly for
the efﬁciency loss parameter, we use a dummy which equals 1 for sessions with efﬁciency loss = 25%, and 0 for the others (see Figure 2b).
15A comprehensive description of the distribution of participants’ tax choices in Parts I, II and III is reported in Appendix Table 3.
16Excluding the show-up fee of $5.
9tax cost. The difference is negligible for low levels of tax cost but signiﬁcant when taxation becomes relatively
expensive.17 This pattern is consistent with the view that redistribution is a conventional good with demand
being downward sloping with respect to the price of taxation.
As for concern with aggregate inefﬁciency, we ﬁnd that subjects in the disinterested and modiﬁed disinter-
ested observer portion of our experiment chose lower levels of redistribution when taxation involved a higher
cost in terms of aggregate payoffs, even when this has no impact on their own expected pay-off. As suggested
by Figure 2b and conﬁrmed in Mann-Whitney tests, the effect is signiﬁcant only when the share of tax revenue
lost reaches 25%, the highest value included in our design.18
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 conﬁrms the signiﬁcant negative impact of tax cost and efﬁciency loss on
Experiment I tax choices using a Tobit regression. Both coefﬁcients have the expected sign, and they remain
large and highly statistically signiﬁcant (1% level) as additional controls are added in columns (2) through (7).
According to these estimates, when tax cost rises to $1 per each additional 10% tax, the preferred tax rate falls
by somewhere between 10 and 12 percentage points. This is in line with the average tax falling from 45%, in
sessions with 0 tax cost, to 34%, in sessions with tax cost of $1. Similarly, when the leakage associated with
redistribution rises to 25%, the preferred tax rate falls by between 7 and 9 percentage points, in line with the
8.4% drop in Figure 2b.
Individual demand for redistribution may also be inﬂuenced by beliefs about the determinants of inequality.
The set-up of Part I, which lets subjects choose different tax rates for each of the four methods, allows us to
study how perception of fairness informs redistributive decisions. If agents are indifferent about how initial
income is determined, we should observe no systematic differences in tax choices across different methods.
However, we do, in fact, observe such differences. In particular, as depicted in Figure 3 subjects tend to express
agreater desirefor redistribution whenpre-tax earningsaredetermined accordingtothe Randomand theWhere
From methods (mean tax rates of 49.3% and 45.1%, respectively) than when relative performances in the Tetris
and Quiz games are used (37.7% and 37.3 respectively).19. These differences are conﬁrmed in the regressions
of columns (2) through (6) of Table 3, in which we include dummy variables for the Where From, Tetris, and
Quiz methods of determining pre-tax earnings. Although preferred tax under the Where From method is never
signiﬁcantly different from that in the default method, Random, the estimates consistently show differences
of about 11%, signiﬁcant at the 1% level, for the preferred redistributive tax when earnings are determined
by performance in a quiz or computer game. These results are in line with others suggesting that aversion to
inequality and demand for redistribution may crucially depend on agents’ beliefs about what causes one to be
rich or poor, and, in general, about how fair the process is that generates the pre-tax income distribution.
In columns (3) - (5) of Table 3 we test for possible inﬂuences of sets of personal characteristics. Column
(3)’s regression suggests that female subjects wanted as much as 13% more of others’ incomes to be redis-
tributed than did male subjects, whereas there are no signiﬁcant differences in demand for redistribution based
on ethnicity. Column (4)’s estimate suggests that the average income of the subjects’ home area is negatively
correlated with the demand for reducing inequality among others, while more risk averse subjects preferred
more equality among others’ incomes. Column (5)’s estimate indicates that subjects self-reporting more po-
17A series of Mann-Whitney tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in the preferred tax between subjects facing $0 up to $0.5 cost per 10%
tax, but do ﬁnd tax choices to be signiﬁcantly lower at $1 tax cost than at lower levels (signiﬁcant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests).
18Recall that in the case of complete equalization, a 25% efﬁciency loss means that a fourth of the total pie is foregone. Two-tailed Mann-
Whitney tests show no signiﬁcant difference in preferred tax between the 0% and 12.5% efﬁciency loss sessions, but a lower preferred tax
at 25% efﬁciency loss than at 12.5%, signiﬁcant at the 10% level, and at 25% versus 0% efﬁciency loss, signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
19To make sure these differences are not driven by a relatively small number of extreme observations, we perform a series of Wilcoxon
matched pair tests for within-subject comparisons. The tests conﬁrm our main ﬁnding, showing that subjects were somewhat more likely
to choose a higher tax for the Random than for the Where From method (p-value: .021), and much more likely to choose a higher tax for
both the Random or Where From methods than for the Quiz or Tetris ones (p-values below 0.001 in all four comparisons). Finally, we ﬁnd
no evidence of signiﬁcant differences in preferences between the Tetris and Quiz methods (p-value: .276).
10litically liberal views preferred more redistributive taxation, while those who took more economics courses
preferred less. Column (6) shows that each of these results is robust to the inclusion of all of the variables in the
previous columns’ speciﬁcations, and column (7)’s regression shows that this remains the case if the pre-tax
income determination method is controlled for by only the combined dummy variable Tetris-Quiz.
In sum, in the disinterested and modiﬁed disinterested observer decisions (Part I), subjects wanted less
redistribution when the direct cost to them or the losses to others through tax leakage were higher and when pre-
tax incomes were performance-based, and subjects from higher-income areas and those taking more economics
courses also preferred signiﬁcantly less redistribution. Subjects who were female, more risk averse, and more
politically liberal preferred signiﬁcantly more redistribution.
Some of these results are relatively familiar and increase conﬁdence in the “normalcy” of the subject pool
andthepossibleexternalvalidityoftheexperiment. Forexample, responsivenesstoTaxCostsuggeststhatthere
is a downward sloping demand for redistribution, while the signiﬁcant correlation of demanded redistribution
and self-reported liberalism helps us to argue against the notion that choices in our experiment may have no
relation to the kinds of preferences expressed in the political sphere. The higher preference for redistribution
among women than among men may be related to previous experimental evidence that women tend to be more
altruistic than men (Eckel and Grossman, 1998), and it also accords with evidence of the gender gap in voting
on social issues in the United States (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). The desire
of many subjects to tamper less with incomes that have in some sense been ”earned” resembles results found
elsewhere (e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985).
Some of the ﬁndings deserve additional comment in view of the fact that the decision-maker in Part I is
(for the most part) an outsider given the opportunity to alter income distribution among others, not an involved
participant. First, the preference for about 8% less taxation when a quarter of tax proceeds would be lost
on administrative leakage indicates that on average subjects do care about efﬁciency (Charness and Rabin,
2000) and not only about equalizing incomes or raising up those of the lowest earners. Second, the impact of
home area income on preferred tax cannot be understood in terms of pure self-interest but must rather be seen
as suggesting a taste, possibly sprouted in the soil of self-interest but carried over to a domain in which self-
interest has no direct application (high income individuals simply view redistribution less favorably). Similarly,
the impact of risk aversion on a decision that has no bearing on the protection of own earnings suggests a
perhaps durable correlation of tastes. In particular, whereas the more risk-averse are expected to prefer more
redistribution to protect their own earnings, in Part II, the Part I result suggests that those who prefer to bear
less risk, personally, also happen to like equality of earnings among others, even if one preference in no way
logically entails the other.20
The strong effect of gender also calls for further unpacking. Upon further examination, one of the most
interesting features of our data turns out to be that virtually all of the difference between male and female
preferences for redistribution found in Table 3 can be attributed to the different ways in which male and female
subjects react to the source of income, the direct cost of redistribution, and redistribution’s efﬁciency cost. The
ﬁrst of these effects is the strongest and is displayed graphically in Figure 4, which shows that whereas males
tended to have a substantially lower demand for redistribution when the inequalities derive from performance,
this was much less true of females. Differences in the effects of tax cost and efﬁciency loss can be similarly
illustrated but are not shown due to space limitation.
20The possibility that more risk-averse subjects may have chosen higher taxes in Part I because they did not understand their own
earnings to be unaffected–in other words, that they confused Part I with Part II - is ruled out by the fact that subjects did not know the Part
II task when making their Part I tax choices, and that all subjects correctly answered questions showing their comprehension of Part I prior
to entering their tax decisions.
11We study further how gender affected tax choice through its interactions with the factors just mentioned
using the series of regressions in Table 4, which also control for the the other individual characteristics included
in Table 3’s main speciﬁcation. Column (1) provides a basic speciﬁcation with only Tax Cost, Efﬁciency
Loss, the Tetris-Quiz methods dummy and the female gender dummy, all showing much the same signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient values as in Table 3. In column (2), inclusion of an interaction term between the female and Tetris-
Quiz dummy variables causes the female dummy’s value to decline by roughly a half and its signiﬁcance level
to fall to only 10%. In column (3), we include instead an interaction term between the female and Tax Cost
variables, and in column (4), an interaction between female and Efﬁciency Loss. Inclusion of these interaction
terms reduces the estimated coefﬁcients on the stand-alone female dummy variable and their signiﬁcance levels
more modestly, and the interaction terms themselves obtain positive coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 10% (column
(3)) and 5% (column (4)) levels. Finally, in the speciﬁcation of column (5), all three interaction terms are
included and each obtains the same signiﬁcance level as in its respective column (2), (3) or (4) speciﬁcation.
Now, however, the coefﬁcient on the stand-alone female dummy variable is less than a tenth of its original
magnitude and its estimate is not remotely signiﬁcant. Together, these results suggest that the effect of gender
on desired redistribution is accounted for by the fact that female subjects are considerably less deterred from
redistributing by incomes being earned in a quiz or Tetris game, the fact that female subjects reduce their
redistributive choice less than males as the direct cost to them rises, and by the fact that female subjects are
much less deterred from redistributing by the presence of substantial transfer inefﬁciency than males.21
B. The “involved observer” under uncertainty: Part II
In Part II of the experiment respondents were invited to select a tax rate for each of the four earnings assignment
methods, knowing that if selected, their preferred tax would be applied to the earning distribution among twenty
participants, thistimeincludingthemselves. Whenmakingtheirchoice, individualswereuncertainaboutwhich
position they would eventually occupy in the distribution of payoffs.
When directly affected by redistribution, agents’ choices can be expected to be inﬂuenced by self-interest
considerations, in addition to any fairness concerns evident in their Part I decisions. Under the Where From,
Tetris and Quiz methods, subjects could form expectations of their possible pre-tax earnings rank and take
these into account when deciding how much to redistribute. If conﬁdent enough about their guess, subjects
with relatively low expected rank (that is, high predicted pre-tax earnings) would have an interest in choosing
a low tax rate, and conversely for those anticipating a high rank. However, uncertainty about earnings rank,
including the radical uncertainty under the Random condition, provides a motive for favoring redistribution if
the individual is risk averse. Finally, individual tax choice could also reﬂect agents’ social preferences and
aversion to inequality (if any).
The regressions in Table 5 explore similarities and differences in tax choices under the Random method in
Part I and II, pooling together the 335 observations for this condition in each Part. As before. we control for
Tax Cost and Efﬁciency Loss (which vary across sessions) and for our risk aversion measure, gender, home area
income, political philosophy response, and number of economics courses. Each variable obtains a signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient of the same sign and similar magnitude to Table 3, except that the coefﬁcient on the Female dummy
variable is quite insigniﬁcant. In column (2), we add a dummy variable to identify the observations from Part
II, and this obtains a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient indicating that on average subjects’ tax choices were
21The coefﬁcients in column (5) indicate that the average female subject reduced preferred tax by only 4% versus 14% for male subjects,
in response to a shift to Quiz or Tetris income determination, that such a subject reduced redistribution by only about 5% versus a male
subject’s 14% reduction when Tax Cost rose to $1 per 10% redistributed, and that she would reduce redistribution by only a little over 1%
versus a male subject’s reduction by over 11% in response to Efﬁciency Loss rising from 0 to 25%.
12about 6% higher in this part, a change in the predicted direction given that there is now an added motivation to
redistribute assuming self-interest coupled with risk aversion.
One way to check whether the preference for more redistribution under the Random method in Part II is
due to risk aversion, as is predicted by theory, is to interact the Part II dummy with our risk aversion measure
(Table 5, column 3). If the measure performs well and if risk aversion is a driver of the desire to redistribute,
the coefﬁcient on the interaction term should be positive and signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, it is neither. This
ﬁnding, is not necessarily devastating to the theory, since risk aversion is notoriously difﬁcult to measure. Other
coefﬁcients, including the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on the risk aversion level term, remain unaffected.
We now turn to the issue of whether, and to what extent, demand for redistribution is inﬂuenced by the
expectation about what position one will occupy in society in the future. We can address this question by
looking at the difference between choices in Part I and Part II for methods other than the Random one.
Overall average tax rates for the three other methods appear to be very similar between Part I and Part II.
For the Where From method the average tax in Part I and II are essentially the same (45.1%); for the Tetris
method the difference is less than 1 percentage point (37.7% in Part I, and 36.8% in Part II), and for the Quiz
method about 2.6% (37.3% in Part I against 39.9% in Part II).
However, this result hides important variations at the individual level. In fact, almost half of the subjects
change their preferred tax choice in Part II relative to Part I, although these changes are generally small (around
20%). This pattern holds for all methods, with a slight tendency for larger changes in the Where From method.
The proportion of participants who choose a higher tax is similar to the share of those choosing a lower tax,
both ranging around 20%.
In Table 6, we report a series of Tobit regressions on only the Part II tax choices under Where From, Quiz,
and Tetris-based determination of pre-tax incomes. As depicted in column 1, most of the results that hold for
Part I decisions continue to hold for those of Part II. In particular, average tax rates decrease with tax cost and
efﬁciency loss; female, liberal, and more risk averse individuals tend to support more redistribution than male,
conservative and less risk averse subjects; preferred tax continues to be negatively correlated with the level of
home area income.22 Only the coefﬁcient on the number of economics courses taken, which is still negative,
loses the signiﬁcance displayed in Table 3.
That the same factors which predict voting for redistribution in Part I operate in the same manner and
explain a similar proportion of the variance in votes for redistribution in Part II suggests that preferences for
greater equality operated in a similar fashion whether the decision-maker was an interested party or not. 23 The
regression in column 2 allows us to explore how important these factors are in comparison with the immediate
self-interest of the decision-maker. This regression adds the subject’s self-reported expected rank to the set
of independent variables. Subjects with a high expected rank (low expected pre-tax earnings) could increase
their expected earnings by voting for a high level of redistributive taxation, while those with low expected
rank expected to earn more with no taxation. This expectation is strongly born out by the distribution of tax
choices in Figure 5 which displays a gradual shift towards more redistribution going from high to low expected
rankings. The estimate in column (2) of Table 6 conﬁrms that self-interest played this role: the coefﬁcient on
expected rank is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The explanatory power of the regression also rises
dramatically, more than doubling according to the Psuedo R-square. By this measure, self-interest is at least
somewhat more important than pure preferences about equality when subjects chose taxes in our experiment
22As in Part I, also in Part II the result on the income variable is driven by the tax choices for the Where From method. When the other
two methods are considered the income variable has essentially no predictive power.
23Another way of demonstrating this is to regress the subject’s tax choice in Part II for a given method on their tax choice in Part I for
the same method. When this is done, the coefﬁcient on Part I tax choice is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
13from behind a partial veil of ignorance.
The remaining speciﬁcations shown in Table 6 take into account variation in a subject’s conﬁdence regard-
ing her prediction of pre-tax earnings rank. In column 3, we add a dummy variable, Conﬁdence, set to 1 for
subjects who reported being very conﬁdent about their prediction of rank and 0 for those who reported being
”somewhat” or “not at all conﬁdent.” 24 We also add an interaction term between Conﬁdence and Expected
Rank. As expected, Conﬁdence has a negative effect on the chosen tax: the less conﬁdent is the subject in his
or her prediction, the more does the situation resemble the Random case, in which a risk-averse individual will
prefer more redistributive taxation, ceteris paribus. The interaction term is signiﬁcant and positive in line with
the prediction that a subject more conﬁdent of having a high pre-tax rank number (low pre-tax earnings) will
want greater redistribution. Appendix Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of these result based on the
regression coefﬁcients.
In columns (4) and (5) we introduce an interaction with an indicator for the methods Tetris and Quiz. In
Part II as in Part I, subjects chose less redistribution under these methods, but perhaps this is partly due to
greater conﬁdence in their predictions of their earnings rank in the Where From than in the Tetris and Quiz
cases. 25 The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the interaction between the Tetris-Quiz dummy and Expected
Rank, in columns (4) and (5), is consistent with this idea: under these two methods, there is less demand for
redistribution by those whose guesses about their own rank, held less conﬁdently, would otherwise tend to
make redistribution desirable. The negative coefﬁcients on the Tetris-Quiz dummy itself are also replaced by
positive ones, apparently because these pre-tax earnings determination methods mainly proxy for uncertainty
once their interaction with expected rank has been controlled for. The effects found in column (4) remain when
the Conﬁdence*Expected Rank interaction is once again included, in column (5).
C. The “involved observer” under perfect information: Part III
The revised decisions in Part III, made after the revelation of exact rank under each of the four methods, provide
evidence on subjects’ distributive preferences and on the weight they place on them relative to own earnings
in the absence of uncertainty and over a substantially wider range of private costs than in Part I. Risk aversion
has no direct relevance in this case, and in principle, a purely self-interested subject should choose either a
100% tax or a 0% tax, depending on his revealed rank under each particular method.26 A deviation toward
redistribution by those whose earnings would be maximized by a 0% tax must reﬂect concern for lower earners
or a preference for equality. By contrast, downward deviations by subjects whose self-interest favors a 100%
tax could be motivated by a belief that the higher incomes are rightfully earned or deserved or by some other
source of reluctance to alter the unequal earnings pattern.
Overall, 147 subjects in 7 experimental sessions were offered the opportunity to revise their initial tax
choice in each of the four methods (for a total of 588 observations). In addition to the usual tax cost, when
revising their preferred tax, individuals took into account their potential additional payoff from redistribution.
This was positive if their ranking was such that they would beneﬁt from taxation, or negative, otherwise.27
24Withregardto theexpectedrankparticipantscould selectoneofthefollowing options: “Positions1-2”(where 1isthehighestincome);
“Positions 3-5”; “Positions 6-8” ; “Positions 9-11”; “Positions 12-14”; “Positions 15-17”; “Positions 18-20”. With regard to the level of
conﬁdence, three options were available: “Very conﬁdent”; “Somewhat conﬁdent” ; “Not at all conﬁdent”.
25Subjects can form good estimates of the relative level of their home area income, but had less basis for guessing their relative perfor-
mance on tasks they had not yet performed. The data show their guesses of earnings rank to be substantially more accurate for the Where
From than for the other two methods; their self-reported conﬁdence in their guesses was also higher.
26Unlike some previous studies (e.g. Herne and Suojanen, 2004) in our experiment participants are not allowed to communicate after
having learned their actual position in the distribution. Furthermore, when making his/her revised tax choices each subject had in hand a
printed copy of Table 2, or of the variant appropriate to the relevant efﬁciency loss.
27In sessions with no efﬁciency loss, for example, redistribution harms the decisive individual if he is ranked between the 1st and the
7th position when tax cost is zero, between the 1st and the 8th position, when tax cost is $0.25, between the 1st and 12th position when
14Altogether, 53.7% of the observations are of subjects facing methods in which their own earnings would
be maximized with a tax of 100%, while for the remaining 46.3% of observations own income would be
maximized by a tax of 0%.
Although agents had no difﬁculty in recognizing and pursuing what was in their interest, about one third
of choices (34.2%) were for a tax rate that did not maximize the chooser’s earnings, and 61.2% of subjects
selected such a tax rate in at least one of their choices. 28
The numbers and sizes of deviations from an income-maximizing tax of 0% and those from an income
maximizing tax of 100% are similar with the average deviation being about 18% and with slightly more and
larger deviations in the upward (pro-equality) than in the downward direction.
It is worth noting that among subjects with the same income-maximizing tax, the cost of taxation varied
signiﬁcantly depending on the exact rank. Intuitively, the cost of redistribution in terms of foregone earnings for
someone at the top of the ranking is higher than for someone ranked 2nd, and so on. Similarly, the net beneﬁt
from redistribution for someone ranked 20th is higher than for someone ranked 19th and so on. To account for
this, we calculated the net cost of a 10% increase in tax for each income rank, tax cost, and efﬁciency loss. For
example, someone ranked 1st in a session with zero efﬁciency loss and $1 tax cost, would sacriﬁce about $9
of his potential payoff per each additional 10% tax he would impose if selected to be decisive. By contrast, in
the same session, someone ranked 9th would still have a positive incentive to choose a zero tax, but deviation
would only cost him about 65 cents per 10% tax. Similarly, for subjects who would potentially beneﬁt from
redistribution, low ranked participants had a much greater incentive to choose a 100% tax than subject ranked
toward the middle. Due to this, the cost of redistribution to the decisive individual covers a much larger range
in Part III than in Part I, allowing observations on willingness to pay for redistribution at costs both well above
the Part I maximum tax cost of $1 per 10% and well below the Part I minimum tax cost of $0 per 10% tax.
Figure 6 reports for each positive or negative total cost per 10% tax increase the average tax selected by
subjectsinPartIII. 29 Asexpected, thoseindividualswho, giventheirrevealedranking, shouldchooseazerotax
rate (net losers) generally support low levels of redistribution. Furthermore, pro-redistribution deviations from
self-interest are decreasing in the cost of taxation. In other words, when their position in the pre-tax earnings
distribution is high and deviating is very costly in terms of foregone earnings, subjects choose a tax rate very
close to 0. However, when deviating from the purely selﬁsh option becomes sufﬁciently cheap, individuals
tend to support higher levels of redistribution and their choices are fairly responsive to variations in the cost of
taxation.30 This pattern is intuitive and certainly reassuring of the fact that subjects had a good understanding
of the experiment and a relatively clear perception of the incentives they faced.
Turning to the left part of the Figure 6, to those subjects who, based on their rank, would beneﬁt from
redistribution (net winners) and should hence choose complete equalization, we can see that the large majority
of these selected a very high tax rate (70% or higher), and about two thirds chose to fully equalize earnings
(average tax rate 82.5%, standard deviation 0.30). The scatter of points suggests some modest responsiveness
to the size of the loss suffered by not selecting full redistribution, but we will see shortly that the relationship
is much ﬂatter than that for costs in the positive range. Nonetheless, enough subjects resist full redistribution,
tax cost is $1. The cut-off point is between the 14th and the 15th position when efﬁciency loss is 12.5% and tax cost is $1, between the
9th and the 10th position when efﬁciency loss is 25% and tax cost is $0 and between the 11th and the 12th position when efﬁciency loss is
25% and tax cost is $0.25
28This proportion is high compared with the ﬁndings of previous experiments involving no income uncertainty and no strategic consid-
erations, such as Rutstrom and Williams (2000). This might be explained in part by subjects’ desires for self-consistency and by the fact
that Part III came after parts I and II.
29Costs on the tails of the distribution are not shown to permit closer inspection of the main part of the data. 4.7% of the observations
lie in the ranges thus excluded.
30When the net cost of taxation is between $0 and $1 per 10%, the average tax rate is 37%, similar to the average tax choice in Part I
(42.3%).
15when in their own interest, to suggest that it’s not the case that subjects are either strictly self-interested or else
egalitarian. Some subjects, in some circumstances, are willing to sacriﬁce personal earnings to maintain some
inequalities (and, when e > 0, to avoid shrinking the pie by redistribution).
In Table 7 we estimate a regression model for Part III tax choices as a function of the total cost of taxation
to the decision-maker (per 10% tax), the square of that cost, a dummy variable “earnings maximizing tax rate”
(EMTR) which is either 1 (100%) or 0, and the interaction between EMTR and total cost of taxation.
As expected, tax choices appear to be very sensitive to the net cost of taxation faced by each subject (both
the coefﬁcients on cost of taxation and its square term have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant).
However, the fact of having a net gain from redistribution has an independent, strong and positive impact on
preferred tax rate.
Indeed, the coefﬁcient on the interaction term between EMTR and the cost of taxation suggests that a
change in the total cost (beneﬁt) of taxation has a signiﬁcant impact only on those subjects with an earnings-
maximizing tax of 0, but has essentially no effect on the choices of net winners.
How do preferences for equality affect individuals’ redistributive choices when uncertainty is resolved? In
principle we would expect individuals with more egalitarian views to be, on the one hand, more inclined to
deviate from the purely self-interested zero tax choice, and, on the other, less likely to deviate from 100% tax
choice when this is in their interest.
One way to test this prediction is by using the tax rate chosen by the same individual for the same method
under the “disinterested observer” condition (Part I) as an indicator of the subject’s genuine “disinterested”
attitude toward equality. To do so in column 2 we include in the initial speciﬁcation the variable “Part I
Tax” corresponding to the tax rate chosen by the same subject for the same method in Part I. In line with our
prediction, the coefﬁcient on the Part I tax choice is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This result conﬁrms
that participants who selected higher taxes in Part I tend to support more redistribution than others in Part III,
and this regardless of their actual ranking and of the cost they face.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between selected tax rate and total cost of taxation, according to the coefﬁ-
cients in column 1 of Table 7. Figure 8 plots the relationships separately for subjects choosing high and low tax
rates in Part I (higher or equal, and lower than 50% respectively)31 It is worth noting again that the predicted tax
choice in Part III when the cost is zero is quite close to that in Part I, suggesting that Part III choices indeed help
us to extend Part I conclusions to a broader set of both positive and negative costs of taxation to the decisive
individual.32 Also worth noting are the sharp discontinuity between the positive and negative cost sides of the
ﬁgures, and the considerably gentler slope of the curves to the left, indicating lesser sensitivity to cost. Finally,
the fact that the average tax remains below 100% even when in the self-interest of the decision-maker suggests
that some inequalities had legitimacy.
V. WHAT LEVEL OF REDISTRIBUTION MAXIMIZES SOCIAL WELFARE?
To what extent should ﬁscal redistribution in a politically democratic industrial market economy be understood
as increasing welfare quite generally, due to a desire for income insurance or a social preference for greater
equality, versus representing the self-interested expropriation of a richer minority by the poor and middle
income majority?
If there is unanimous agreement (even among those with higher pre-tax incomes) that income should be
31These estimates are based on the coefﬁcient of a separate regression, analogous to the one in Table 7 column (2), in which, instead of
the actual Part I tax rate, we include a dummy variable which equals one for those subjects who chose a tax rate of 50% or higher for the
same method in Part I, and 0 otherwise.
32The fact that for very high tax costs, the estimated curves imply a preference for negative rates of taxation is an artifact of the
speciﬁcation of Table 7’s regressions, which do not explicitly impose the lower limit actually faced by our subjects.
16distributed more equally, then taxing and redistributing income can be Pareto-improving. But if a majority
favors some redistribution and a minority prefers that there be none, as in our results, then to say whether
“society” is better off redistributing, and how much redistribution is best, requires some way of aggregating the
well-being of different individuals.
To illustrate, we conduct an exercise which posits a speciﬁc cardinal form of utility function that can
be calibrated from our data to determine what level of redistribution maximizes additive (Benthamite) social
welfare. In our exercises, we assume that each individual’s utility is a function of:
1. her expected post-tax earnings;
2. the (expected) variance of her earnings (a measure of the income uncertainty to which she is exposed);
3. the degree of income inequality in the overall population;
4. the aggregate earnings of the population.
For simplicity, we suppress consideration of the individual characteristics xi that were included in equation
(4), and we decompose function fi of that equation into additively separable functions of i’s income and its
variance. Factors (3) and (4) are assumed to be only functions of the vector of income for the twenty individuals
whose earnings are determined by the tax rate chosen by the decisive individual. We use a simple statistic, one
minus the Gini coefﬁcient, to capture the degree of equality in the income distribution, and we assume that
the function gi (
P
~ yj) of equation (4) takes the multiplicative form i y, where  is a scalar and  y the average
income. Then the utility function can be written as:
Ui = E(yi) + i(yi) +  ih(1   Gini) + i y (5)
To facilitate the recovery of the parameters of function U, we assume function h to have a quadratic form:
h(1   Gini) = a + b(1   Gini) + c(1   Gini)2
After multiplying and renaming the coefﬁcients and dropping the constant, we can rewrite the utility func-
tion as follows:
Ui = E(yi) + i(yi) + 
i(1   Gini) + i(1   Gini)2 + i y (6)
Under the assumption that subjects choose the tax rate that maximizes their utility under each experimental
condition, we can use our experimental data to estimate the parameters of the utility function. While the form
of the utility function is assumed to be common across all subjects, the parameters of (5) are allowed to vary
with speciﬁc individual characteristics such as risk aversion, political ideology, and concern for efﬁciency.33
The estimation model differs somewhat when analyzing tax choices performed in part I, in part II (under
random and non-random methods respectively), and part III. For example, since the decisive individual faces
no income uncertainty in both part I and III,  - the coefﬁcient on income variance -cannot be estimated from
tax choices made under those conditions. Similarly, the estimating equations for parts II and III take into
account the fact that the payoff of the decisive individual depends on her expected or actual rank, whereas rank
is irrelevant to her payoff in Part I.
Finally, while in principle we view each subject as having a unitary utility function that responds differently
to different conditions, it is convenient to capture differences in response to inequalities having different origins
33More precisely we allow income variance to matter more for subjects with higher measured risk-aversion, concern for equality to be
greater for subjects with more liberal political ideology, and ﬁnally concern for redistributive efﬁciency to be larger for participants having
taken more economics courses, but we allow the degree of inﬂuence of these concerns, if any, to be established by the data.
17by estimating utility function parameters separately based on the tax choices made under each method. We also
carry out estimates with the combined data of Part I, for reference purposes.
Leaving the details of the derivation for the Appendix, in Table 8 we show the implied signs of parameters
 , 
 ,  and  for each of the four subsets of our data, as well as the signiﬁcance levels of the coefﬁcients on
which each parameter estimate is based.34
The results support the idea that most subjects are concerned with inequality, and that their utilities display
some level of concavity in our Gini-based equality measure: all coefﬁcients on which the estimates of 
 and
 are based, are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and have signs and numerical values consistent with
substantial concavity in the relevant range. Results for , the coefﬁcient on aggregate income, are supportive
of the expectation that efﬁciency matters in Part I and Part II Random choices, but have a sign opposite than
expected and are statistically insigniﬁcant in the other two estimates. The key coefﬁcient for estimating , the
coefﬁcient on own income uncertainty, is insigniﬁcant for both Part II estimates.
The concavity of the utility functions with respect to equality implies that for most subjects utility reaches
a maximum at an interior value of t. The four panels of Figure 9 illustrate the relationship between utility
and t for different population subsets and income determination methods based on Part I tax choices. Panel (a)
shows the average relationship between utility and t for those subjects who self-reported to be very conservative
(response 1 on the 1-7 political ideology scale), while panel (b) shows the corresponding relationship for very
liberal ones (response 7).35. We also estimated the utility function parameters separately for each income
determination method. In panel (c) we show the relationship between utility and tax rate for a subject with
average ideology under the Random method, and in panel (d), the corresponding relationship under the Quiz
method. For an individual with average political ideology the optimal tax rate is 30% when the pre-tax income
is determined randomly, and 40% when it is determined according to the performance in the quiz.
With the utility function estimates in hand, we can now calculate the value of t that maximizes the sum of
subjects’ utilities under various conditions. For example, basing the utility function estimate on all tax choices
in Part I - without regard to determinant of initial income - the tax rate that maximizes the sum of utilities is
43.0%. If we only use the tax choices under the Random income determination method, the tax maximizing
the sum of utilities is 52.3%, versus a rate of only 37.7% based on tax choices for the Tetris method. Using tax
choices by involved observers in the Random income condition of Part II, the tax rate maximizing the sum of
utilities is 55.5%.36 Thus, even when not personally affected by the outcome, our subjects’ summed welfare
appears higher when substantial redistribution occurs, especially when income differences don’t seem to be
earned. The additional effect of self-involvement (the shift to Part II) is not large.
How do our subjects’ tastes for redistribution compare to the amount of redistribution delivered by the real-
world political process? Actual redistribution of income through the U.S. ﬁscal system does not conform to
potential outcomes in the experiment, because federal income taxes have a progressive rather than proportion-
ate structure, much revenue is generated by other federal, state and local taxes, only a fraction of the revenue
collected goes into transfer payments, some progressivity-imparting transfers are income-tested, various ex-
emptions apply, and so forth. Nevertheless, we can get an impression of how the apparent preferences of our
34As shown in the Appendix, the imputed value of  is based on the estimate of one coefﬁcient only, while the values of  , 
 and 
are based on the joint estimation of that and another coefﬁcient. Since the coefﬁcient from which we recover the value of  turns out to be
highly signiﬁcant in all cases, we report in the columns for  , 
 and  only the signiﬁcance levels for the other relevant coefﬁcient in each
case.
35The utility levels displayed in Figure 9 are calculated assuming c = 1 and e = .25, and for an average number of economics courses
taken (approximately 1.3). The exercise abstracts from the disutility due to risk born by the decisive individual but unrelated to the chosen
t.
36The sum of utilities based on the Where From condition and the Quiz condition choices achieve their maximum with t = 45.9% and t
= 38.1%, respectively.
18subjects relate to the degree of redistribution observed in the U.S. and other industrialized countries by compar-
ing before- and after-tax-and-transfer (for convenience, we’ll say more simply “pre- and post-tax”) inequality
in the experiment to that observed at the macro level. Our experiment imposes the same pre-tax inequality on
subjects as was actually observed in the U.S. The associated Gini coefﬁcient is 0.51. The median preferred
taxes in experiments I, II and III - 40%, 40% and 60%, respectively - would bring the Gini coefﬁcient down
to 0.306, 0.306 and 0.204.37 These outcomes can be compared to the actual post-tax Gini coefﬁcient for U.S.
individuals in 2000, 0.401.
Comparison with the degrees of redistribution inferred from the experiment data suggest that our subjects
may be somewhat unrepresentative of the overall U.S. population, that choices made in the context of our lab-
oratory experiment are not perfect proxies for the preferences voters have in mind when they go to the polls, or
that the political process does not generate outcomes that perfectly match median preferences. One reason may
be that the high level of redistribution preferred in Part III, especially, reﬂects mainly the self-interest of most
individuals in redistribution given the right skewed distribution of pre-tax incomes, but may exaggerate inter-
est in redistribution in a more realistic setting because real world voters may take into consideration dynamic
(incentive) effects of taxation that are lacking in our experiment. Nevertheless, our subjects’ preferences do
not seem to be completely “off the map” for voters in industrial democracies, since their desired post-tax Gini
coefﬁcients are for most conditions slightly larger than those in very egalitarian countries such as Denmark
(Gini=0.220) or Sweden (0.261).38
VI. CONCLUSIONS
What is the relative importance of social preferences for equality as opposed to other forces such as self-interest
and risk aversion in determining support for redistribution at the societal level? Does demand for redistribution
vary with the perception of whether earnings are ‘deserved’ or not?
To address these questions, we conducted sixteen experimental sessions in each of which each of twenty-
one subjects could potentially determine the degree, if any, to which an array of earnings mirroring U.S. pre-tax
income distribution would be modiﬁed by a linear tax-and-transfer scheme under earned and unearned income
conditions as well as in both the situation of a disinterested observer and that of an involved observer, the latter
both under uncertainty about own position and after resolution of uncertainty. Our experiment is distinctive in
its combination of large groups, large subject pool, macro framing, decision-making under multiple conditions,
and variation of both direct cost to decision-maker and efﬁciency cost of redistribution. While participants
were mainly undergraduates at Brown University, a smaller set of parallel sessions obtained similar results for
non-student adult subjects.
Both the median selected tax rates and the tax rates maximizing the sum of calibrated utility functions
(aggregate social welfare) call for the elimination of about half of pre-tax income inequality when the efﬁciency
loss is low or zero. Self-interest stands out as a dominant concern in the interested decision-maker conditions,
with most choices converging toward the degree of redistribution maximizing own income when uncertainty of
position is resolved and with high redistribution levels being a natural outcome of the right-skewed nature of
the pre-tax distribution. Yet preferred redistribution levels were only a few percent lower in the disinterested
observer condition. Because the situation in which voters ﬁnd themselves when voting on candidates who will
determine tax and transfer levels resembles more that of our involved observer conditions, with some degree of
uncertainty but also some knowledge of position, our ﬁndings suggest that self-interest, including risk-aversion,
37The tax levels that would maximize the social welfare function as discussed above, 37.7% for the Tetris method and 52.3% for the
Random method, correspond to Gini coefﬁcients of 0.318, and 0.243 respectively.
38Gini coefﬁcients for disposable income in 2001, from the United Nations World Income Inequality Database
19sufﬁces in practice to explain most of the observed preference for reducing inequalities by state action. But our
data also suggest that disinterested social preferences for equality would lead to only slightly lower levels of
redistribution, were concerns about the impact on own earnings not present.
Turning to the second question with which we began this section, our subjects’ choices suggested a consid-
erable impact of whether relative pre-tax earnings were or were not determined by knowledge or skill, with the
average preferred level of taxation and redistribution being about 27% greater in “earned” than in “unearned”
income conditions.39 Our ﬁndings are consistent with the suggestions of authors like Benabou and Tirole
(2006) that differences in demand for redistribution across countries may be explained, at least in part, by dif-
ferent beliefs about the extent to which pre-tax inequalities are earned. The lion’s share of the sensitivity of
preferred redistribution to source of inequality is attributable to male subjects (the average difference between
“earned” and “unearned” methods being 14.5%), with female subjects typically preferring more redistribution
in all conditions and showing an average difference of only 4% between preferred redistribution in “earned”
vs. “unearned” inequality conditions. We thus illuminate the sources of differences in voting by gender while
also conﬁrming a gender gap that is large and consistent with female voters’ observed differential inclination
to vote for candidates and parties associated with greater tax progressivity and more social spending.
How valid, if at all, is extrapolating from these ﬁndings to the political economy of taxation and redistribu-
tion? Clearly, our ﬁndings can be no more than suggestive, among other reasons because stakes averaging $25
are small compared to U.S. annual incomes and because our experiment abstracts from production, investment,
and the incentive issues attaching to them. But we can allay some other common concerns. For instance, ex-
perimentalists speak of an experimenter demand effect in which subjects do what they guess the experimenter
wants them to do, and they worry about the possibility that subjects will take actions that appear economically
irrational simply to avoid boredom if these are the only action opportunities offered them. Might our subjects
have chosen to redistribute earnings simply to have something to do or because opportunities to dis-equalize
were not on offer? Although our disinterested observer condition (Part I) could potentially suffer from such
problems, several factors suggest to us that they are not major concerns.
First, Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994) ﬁnd that ﬁrst-mover sending is greatly reduced in dic-
tator games when double-blindness is assured, as is the case in our design. Second, in our interested observer
conditions, andespeciallyaftertheresolutionofuncertainty(PartIII),mostsubjectshadopportunitiestochoose
distributions that were more unequal than the one maximizing their own earnings, and more did so when pre-tax
incomes were earned, suggesting fairness concerns other than preferences for equality. That tax choices tended
to vary systematically with self-interest, that they were responsive to direct and efﬁciency costs, and that they
varied signiﬁcantly with pre-tax income determination method, gender, and self-reported political philosophy,
all suggest that perceived experimenter demand, or doing something rather than nothing, were not the main
factors behind subjects decisions in our experiment.
In sum, our data appear to provide real insights into the demands for redistribution that play an important
role in modern economies and polities. Use of experimental methods like ours with more diverse subject pools,
including subjects in countries exhibiting different tax and transfer preferences than the United States, could
further expand our understanding of why states redistribute.
39An average tax rate of 47% and 37% respectively.
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23Rank t = 0% t = 10% t = 20% t = 30% t = 40% t = 50% t = 60% t = 70% t = 80% t = 90% t = 100%
1 100.0 92.0 84.0 75.9 67.9 59.9 51.9 43.9 35.8 27.8 19.8
2 46.1 43.4 40.8 38.2 35.6 32.9 30.3 27.7 25.1 22.4 19.8
3 36.6 34.9 33.2 31.5 29.9 28.2 26.5 24.8 23.2 21.5 19.8
4 30.8 29.7 28.6 27.5 26.4 25.3 24.2 23.1 22.0 20.9 19.8
5 26.5 25.9 25.2 24.5 23.8 23.2 22.5 21.8 21.2 20.5 19.8
6 23.3 23.0 22.6 22.3 21.9 21.6 21.2 20.9 20.5 20.2 19.8
7 20.6 20.5 20.5 20.4 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.1 20.0 19.9 19.8
8 18.4 18.6 18.7 18.8 19.0 19.1 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.7 19.8
9 16.3 16.6 17.0 17.3 17.7 18.0 18.4 18.8 19.1 19.5 19.8
10 14.5 15.0 15.5 16.1 16.6 17.1 17.7 18.2 18.7 19.3 19.8
11 12.7 13.4 14.1 14.9 15.6 16.3 17.0 17.7 18.4 19.1 19.8
12 11.1 12.0 12.9 13.7 14.6 15.5 16.3 17.2 18.1 18.9 19.8
13 9.6 10.6 11.6 12.6 13.7 14.7 15.7 16.7 17.8 18.8 19.8
14 8.1 9.3 10.5 11.6 12.8 14.0 15.1 16.3 17.5 18.6 19.8
15 6.8 8.1 9.4 10.7 12.0 13.3 14.6 15.9 17.2 18.5 19.8
16 5.5 7.0 8.4 9.8 11.2 12.7 14.1 15.5 17.0 18.4 19.8
17 4.3 5.9 7.4 9.0 10.5 12.1 13.6 15.2 16.7 18.3 19.8
18 3.1 4.8 6.4 8.1 9.8 11.5 13.1 14.8 16.5 18.1 19.8
19 1.5 3.3 5.2 7.0 8.8 10.7 12.5 14.3 16.1 18.0 19.8
20 0.1 2.1 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 11.9 13.9 15.9 17.8 19.8
Table 1.  Part I Participants' Earnings Distribution under Different Tax Rates (with efficiency loss=0%)
24time
Figure 1. Sequence of the Experimental Session
25Total 4(84) 4(84) 4(83) 4(84) 16 (336)
Note: numbers in parenthesis indicate the total number of subjects participating in the experimental sessions.
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Table 2. Experimental Sessions and Subjects by Tax Cost and Dead Weight Loss
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Figure 2. Part 1 Average Tax Rate by Tax Cost and Efficiency Loss
26(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.116*** -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.105*** -0.105***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
-0.082*** -0.082*** -0.071*** -0.087*** -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.073***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
-0.040 -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.042
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
-0.113*** -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.116***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
-0.111*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.114***



















0.303*** 0.374*** 0.312*** 0.645*** 0.220*** 0.519*** 0.496***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.024) (0.164) (0.047) (0.178) (0.177)
Observations 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340
Uncensored observations 837 837 837 837 837 837 837
Left-censored observations 316 316 316 316 316 316 316
Right-censored observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Log Likelihood -1155 -1142 -1118 -1131 -1125 -1098 -1099
Chi2 40.334 66.378 113.711 88.816 100.115 154.259 151.816
Pseudo-R square 0.017 0.028 0.048 0.038 0.043 0.066 0.065









Table 3. Tobit Regressions for Part I (All methods)


































Random Where From Tetris Quiz
Figure 3. Part I Average Tax Choice by Method


























































Random Where From Tetris Quiz
Males
Figure 4. Part I  Average Tax Choice by Method and Gender
28(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.105*** -0.105*** -0.141*** -0.105*** -0.142***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028)
-0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.113*** -0.114***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
0.104*** 0.055* 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.009
(0.020) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032)
-0.096*** -0.142*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.143***







0.496*** 0.52*** 0.426** 0.475*** 0.529***
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178)
Observations 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340
Uncensored observations 837 837 837 837 837
Left-censored observations 316 316 316 316 316
Right-censored observations 187 187 187 187 187
Log Likelihood -1099 -1096 -1097 -1097 -1092
Chi2 151.816 158.535 155.380 156.396 166.914
Pseudo-R square 0.065 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.071
The following controls are included in the regression and maintain the expected sign and statistical significance: measure of risk aversion, ethnic dummies, 
log income, self-reported political identification, # of economics courses taken.






Female * Tax Cost
Female * Efficiency Loss
Constant
Table 4. Tobit Regressions for Part I with Gender Interaction Terms
Dependent variable: Part I Tax Choice
29(1) (2) (3)
Tax Cost -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.145***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Efficiency Loss -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Female 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Income 0.047** 0.047** 0.047**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Risk Aversion 0.008** 0.008** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Political Philosophy 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Economics Courses -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Part II 0.059** 0.076*
(0.027) (0.043)
Part II * Risk Aversion -0.003
(0.007)
Constant -0.311 -0.342 -0.351
[0.253] [0.253] [0.254]
Observations 670 670 670
Uncensored observations 421 421 421
Left-censored observations 111 111 111
Right-censored observations 138 138 138
Log Likelihood -552 -550 -550
Pseudo-R square 0.068 0.072 0.072
Chi2 80.924 85.557 85.815
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 Table 5. Tobit Regressions for Parts I and II Pooled (Random Method)
Dependent variable: Part I and II Tax Choice
Ethnic dummies are included in the regression. Coefficients shown are marginal effects.
30(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.088*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.073*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.065***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
0.133*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.096*** 0.094***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
-0.109*** -0.040** -0.038** -0.029 -0.028
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
0.008*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.025*** 0.021** 0.020** 0.022*** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.065*** -0.044** -0.055** 0.114** 0.097*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.049) (0.050)
0.038*** 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.044***







Observations 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005
Uncensored observations 651 651 651 651 651
Left-censored observations 237 237 237 237 237
Right-censored observations 117 117 117 117 117
Log Likelihood -762 -651 -644 -645 -638
Pseudo-R square 0.091 0.225 0.233 0.232 0.240
Chi2 153.538 377.084 391.272 388.963 402.048
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Female
Table 6. Tobit Regressions for Part II with Expected Rank and Confidence (WF, Tetris, and Quiz Methods)
Dependent variable: Part II Tax Choice
Tax Cost
Efficiency Loss
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Figure 6. Part III. Average Tax Choice by Total Cost of Taxation
 
 
Note: the “Total Cost of Taxation” includes the regular tax cost parameter used in the 
experimental session as well as the additionall cost of redistribution which depends on each 
individual’s revealed rank. 
32(1) (2)
Tot. Cost of Taxation ($ per 10%) -0.360*** -0.346***
(0.053) (0.054)
Total Cost of Taxation 
2 0.032*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.006)
Earnings-Maximising Tax Rate 0.312*** 0.345***
(0.065) (0.064)
EMTR * Cost of Taxation 0.358*** 0.365***
(0.080) (0.081)
Part I Tax 0.309***
(0.059)
Observations 588 588
Uncensored observations 149 149
Left-censored observations 197 197
Right-censored observations 242 242
Log Likelihood -443 -429
Pseudo-R square 0.302 0.324
Chi2 383.574 411.091
Coefficients shown are marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 7. Tobit Regressions for Part III (All Methods)
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Part I High Tax Part I Low Tax
Figure 8. Part III Tax Choice by Cost of Taxation
34Part I n.a.  +  (***)  -  (***)  +  (***)
Part II (Random method)  -  ( )   +  (***)  -  (***) +  (*)
Part II (Non-random methods)  +  ( )   +  (***)  -  (***) +  ( )
Part III n.a.  -  (***)  -  (***)  -   ( ) 
(*) significant at the 10% level, (**)5%, (***) 1%
Table 8. Estimates of the Utility Function Parameters
δ Experimental Condition βγη
35Twentieth/Rank Income Earnings
1 $157,423 $100.00 
2 $72,488 $46.05 
3 $57,538 $36.55 
4 $48,516 $30.82 
5 $41,776 $26.54 
6 $36,697 $23.31 
7 $32,458 $20.62 
8 $28,991 $18.42 
9 $25,637 $16.29 
10 $22,795 $14.48 
11 $20,028 $12.72 
12 $17,525 $11.13 
13 $15,052 $9.56 
14 $12,818 $8.14 
15 $10,715 $6.81 
16 $8,699 $5.53 
17 $6,792 $4.31 
18 $4,878 $3.10 
19 $2,383 $1.51 
20 $166 $0.11 
Source: US Census Bureau, 2000










< $ 20,000 65 19.4%
$ 20,000 - $ 40,000 176 52.5%
$ 40,000 - $ 60,000 67 20.0%






2 or less 283 84.5%
More than 2 52 15.5%







37All Random Where From Tetris Quiz
t=0% 23.6% 20.0% 24.5% 25.7% 24.2%
t=10% 6.2% 3.9% 8.1% 5.7% 7.2%
t=20% 6.6% 5.1% 5.7% 8.4% 7.5%
t=30% 11.0% 8.1% 9.3% 13.4% 13.1%
t=40% 8.4% 8.1% 5.1% 9.3% 11.3%
t=50% 10.2% 14.6% 7.5% 8.4% 10.5%
t=60% 5.5% 5.4% 4.8% 6.6% 5.1%
t=70% 5.8% 5.1% 6.6% 5.7% 6.0%
t=80% 5.2% 5.7% 5.1% 5.4% 4.5%
t=90% 3.6% 5.1% 4.5% 3.3% 1.5%
t=100% 14.0% 19.1% 19.1% 8.4% 9.3%
All Random Where From Tetris Quiz
t=0% 21.0% 13.1% 26.0% 25.1% 19.7%
t=10% 6.0% 3.6% 7.5% 6.3% 6.9%
t=20% 7.2% 5.4% 5.4% 9.3% 8.7%
t=30% 11.2% 8.7% 9.6% 13.1% 13.4%
t=40% 8.2% 8.1% 3.6% 10.2% 11.0%
t=50% 10.5% 16.1% 5.7% 8.7% 11.3%
t=60% 5.8% 4.8% 6.3% 5.1% 7.2%
t=70% 6.8% 7.5% 7.5% 6.9% 5.4%
t=80% 5.1% 5.7% 5.4% 5.1% 4.2%
t=90% 4.0% 5.1% 3.9% 3.9% 3.3%
t=100% 14.3% 22.1% 19.4% 6.6% 9.0%
All Random Where From Tetris Quiz
t=0% 33.5% 35.4% 34.7% 30.6% 33.3%
t=10% 3.9% 0.7% 5.4% 4.8% 4.8%
t=20% 1.5% 1.4% 0.7% 3.4% 0.7%
t=30% 3.1% 3.4% 3.4% 2.7% 2.7%
t=40% 3.1% 2.7% 1.4% 0.7% 7.5%
t=50% 3.7% 6.8% 3.4% 2.7% 2.0%
t=60% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.4% 2.7%
t=70% 3.2% 3.4% 2.0% 4.8% 2.7%
t=80% 2.0% 0.7% 3.4% 2.7% 1.4%
t=90% 2.7% 2.0% 2.7% 4.1% 2.0%
t=100% 41.2% 41.5% 40.8% 42.2% 40.1%
Appendix Table 3. Distribution of Tax Choices for Part I, II, and III by Method
Part I (335 subjects, 1340 choices)
Part II  (335 subjects, 1340 choices)



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Expected Rank
Not Confident Very Confident
Appendix Figure 1. Part II Tax Choice by Exp. Rank and Confidence
 
Note: predicted tax choice for a subject of average characteristics, based on coefficients 




working class ; middle class; upper middle class; rich
Question:
Possible answers:
Question: When your mother was growing up, were her parents:
On a scale of 1 (Very Conservative) to 7 (Very Liberal)
When you were in high school, did your family live in:










Considering your family's income, what your family has to live on and the cost of living,
Appendix Table 4. Questions used to construct the Political Philosophy and the Socioeconomic Status indicators
4.
Which of the following best describes your political inclination (affiliation)?
Republican; Democrat; Independent; don’t know; other
Which of the following best describes your political philosophy (ideology)?
When you were growing up, were your parents:
working class ; middle class; upper middle class; rich
Question:
2.
how would you say your family is making out today?
When your father was growing up, were his parents:
working class ; middle class; upper middle class; rich
6.
How would you characterize the principal wage-earner in your family? 
Question:
Possible answers:
Possible answers: all right ; fairly well ; quite pinched ; not making ends meet
Question:
2.
a professional (doctor, lawyer, dentist, accountant, etc.) ; a business person, executive, or manager ; a small 
business owner ; an ordinary employee ; other
5.
Possible answers:
Possible answers:
3.
40